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ABSTRACT
We propose and implement a new test of the dividend signaling hypothesis that is
designed to discriminate between dividend signaling and other theories that would account for
the apparent existence of a dividend preference. Our test refines the use of data on stock price
responses to dividend announcements. In particular, we study the effect of dividend taxation on
the bang-for-the-buck, which we define as the share price response per dollar of dividends.
Most dividend signaling models imply that an increase in dividend taxation should increase the
bang-for-the-buck. In contrast, other dividend preference theories imply that an increase in
dividend taxation should decrease the bang-for-the-buck. Since there have recently been
considerable variation in the tax treatment of dividends, we are able to study dividend
announcement effects under different tax regimes. Our central finding is that there is a strong
positive relationship between dividend tax rates and the bang-for-the-buck. This result supports
the dividend signaling hypothesis, and is consistent with alternatives. The paper also provides
corroborating evidence based on the relationship between the bang-for-the-buck and bond ratings.
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and NBER1. Introduction
Economists have proposed numerous theories designed to explain corporate
dividend policy. Different views about dividend policy lead to strikingly
different conclusions about issues such as the cost of capital and the effects
of tax policy. It is, therefore, important to distinguiah between these
theories on the basis of empirical evidence. Unfortunately, this task has
proven difficult.
In an attempt to test various theories of corporate dividend policy,
Poterba and Summers (1983, 1984, 1985] assembled evidence on the relative
market value of dividends and capital gains, the effect of dividend taxation
on dividend payout, and the effect of dividend taxation on investment. Their
evaluation of this evidence was favorable to a "traditional view" of
dividends, in which firms derive an advantage from the payment of dividends,
and where this advantage is reflected in market value. This class of theories
is obviously very broad, and includes (among other things) the possibility
that firms pay dividends to signal private information about profitability,1
the hypothesis that dividends provide a mechanism for restricting managerial
discretion,2 and the conjecture that investors prefer dividends for
non-traditional, behavioral reasons.3
The fact that stock prices rise when companies announce plans to increase
dividends, and fall when companies reveal that they intend to cut dividends,
1 Seee.g. Bhattacharys (1979, 1980), Haksnsson (1982), Miller and Rock
(1985), Kumar (1988), Kumar end Spatt (1987), John and Williams (1985),
Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987), John and Nachman (1987), and Bernheim
(1991).
2 See Jensen and Meckling (1976).
3
See Shefrin and Statmsn (1984).
1is often cited as evidence for the theory that dividends signal
profitability.4 Unfortunately, this evidence does not distinguish between the
hypothesis that tha dividend conveys good news, snd the hypothesis that the
dividend is the good news. Thus, although studies of dividend announcement
effects lend additional support to Poterba and Summers' "traditional view,"
they do not allow us to differentiate between dividend signaling and other
explanations for a dividend preference.
Under the dividend signaling hypothesis, firms that pay high levels of
dividends should be more profitable than otherwise identical firms (from the
point of view of the investor) that pay lower levels of dividends. This
observation suggests that one can teat the signaling theory by examining the
extent to which current dividends help to predict future earnings. Several
early studies (Watts (1973) and Conedes (1978)) concluded that dividends are
essentially unrelated to subsequent earnings. However, a more recent study by
Ofer and Siegel (1987) found that analysts revise their earnings forecasts in
response to unanticipated dividend changes, and moreover that these revisions
are rational.
Another empirical strategy was proposed by Lang and Litzenberger (1989).
These authors argued that, under the managerial discipline hypothesis,
dividend announcements should have larger, positive effects on share price
when firma are overinvesting. This suggests that one should find larger share
price responses among firms that have lower values of Tobin's Q. Lang and
Litzenberger present data that are consistent with this prediction, and
The literature on stock price responses to announcements of changes in
dividend policy includes papers by Pettit (1972, 1977), Laub (1976), Charest
(1978), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Eades (1982),
Brickley (1983), Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984), and Eades, Hess, and Kim
(1983).conclude that the data on share price responses to dividend announcements
support the managerial discipline hypothesis, rather than dividend signaling.
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the existing evidence is
mixed; the literature has not succeeded in resolving the importance of
dividend signaling relative to other variants of the "traditional" view. In
thia paper, we contribute to this debate by proposing and implementing a new
test of dividend signaling that is designed to discriminate between
signaling and other theories of dividend preference. Our test refines the
use of data on stock price responses to dividend announcements. In
particular, we study the effect of dividend taxation on the -
"bang-for-the-buck,"which we define as the share price response per dollar
of dividends. Most dividend signaling models imply that an increase in
dividend taxation should increase the bang-for-the-buck. On the other hand,
other dividend preference theories imply that an increase in dividend taxation
should decrease the bang-for-the-buck. Since there has recently been
considerable variation in the tax treatment of dividends, we are able to study
dividend announcement effects under different tax regimes. Our central
finding is that there is a strong positive relationship between dividend tax
rates and the bang-for-the-buck. This result supports the dividend
signaling hypothesis, and is inconsistent with alternative theories of a
dividend preference, such as the managerial discipline hypothesis.
Our analysis of tax effects suggests a much broader strategy for testing
the dividend signaling hypothesis. The dividend tax rate is simply one
example of a publicly observed factor that is positively correlated with the
marginal costs of paying dividends. Under the dividend signaling hypothesis,
the bang-for-the-buck will tend to be high when observable information
suggests that the marginal costs of paying dividends is high; the alternativehypotheses have the opposite implication. There are many publicly observed
variables that are probably correlated with the marginal costs of paying
dividends. One obvious candidate is a firm's bond rating. Our empirical
analysis reveals a negative relationship between bond ratings and the
bang-for-the-buck. Since the marginal cost of dividends is presumably low
when the bond rating is high, this result corroborates our central finding:
the bang-for-the-buck is high when, on the basis of public information, a
rational investor would expect dividends to be costly. This finding provides
additional support for the dividend signaling hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explore the
relationship between dividend taxation and the bang-for-the-buck under several
alternative theories of corporate dividend policy. Our empirical strategy is
discussed in section 3. Section 4 contains a description of the data. We
present our results in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Preliminaries
In this section, we explore the relationship between the
bang-for-the-buck and the dividend tax rate under several alternative theories
of corporate dividend policy. Each of these theories implies that dividend
payout, y, other observable characteristics, w, and the tax rate, r, are
related to the market valuation of the firm according to some function
V(y,w,r). The "bang-for-the-buck" refers to the impact of dividends on





Of course, one can also use V(y,w,r) as a measure of the marginal
bang- for- the-buck.2.1 Dividend Signaling
A careful reading of recent papers on dividend signaling reveals that an
increase in the tax rate applicable to dividends has the effect of increasing
the bang-for-the-buck. The purpose of this section is to exhibit this result
in the context of a simple signaling model, and to argue that the principle
should be reasonably general.
The basic intuition for the result is straightforward. In a standard
dividend signaling model, high quality firms pay dividends in order to
deter imitation by lower quality firms. Higher dividend taxes make dividends
more costly. Consequently, a high quality firm does not need to pay as large
a dividend in order to deter imitation. Thus, the firm manages to convey the
same information but at a lower level of payout.
Unfortunately, the result is not quite so simple. Although the high
quality firm pays a smaller dividend, the total costs associated with dividend
payment may actually be larger due to the higher tax rate. Consequently, the
equilibrium value of a high quality firm may fall as the tax rate risea. This
implies that both the numerator and the denominator in equation (1) will
decline --theultimate impact on the bang-for-the-buck is not clear priori.
To show how these effects play out, we consider a simple model of
dividend signaling, based loosely on Bhattacharya [1979). We use 9 to denote
the characteristics of the firm that are not publicly observable.9 takes on
values in the interval [9 ,9 ]. Thefundamental value of a firm (that is, the L H
value that it would command in a world of symmetric information) is given as a
function of observable and unobservable characteristics, dividends, and
dividend taxes. We will write this function as
(2) V8(y,9,w,r)— v'(y,9,w)-ry
S(where r is the tax rate applicable to dividends). Throughout, we take V"()
to be differentiable in all of its arguments. To represent the notion that 9
denotes a higher level of quality than 9L' we assume that V > 0. Dividends
are assumed to be costly, so V<0 for r > 0. Finally, we will for
simplicity assume that dividends are more costly on the margin to lower
quality firms (VS9 > 0). Under this last assumption, our model satisfies the
"single crossing property," which allows us to analyze signaling equilibria in
the standard way. A failure of this property would not qualitatively alter
our ultimate conclusion (see Bernheim [1991]).
The quality parameter 9 is known only to the manager of the firm.
Investors observe the firm's other characteristics (a), its dividend (y), and
the dividend tax rate (c). The market valuation must therefore depend only on
y, co and r. We will write this valuation as V"(y,co,r). This function is
produced endogenously as a consequence of the signaling equilibrium.
We assume that managers care both about current market value and their
own assessment of value. The justification for this assumption is standard
(see e.g. Bernheim [1991]). In particular, the managerial objective function
is given by
(3) V (y,co,r) + cV"(y,9,co,r)
where m is some fixed parameter.
We solve for a separating equilibrium conditional upon the exogenous
observables, a and r. Managers choose y to maximize (1). For each 9, the
optimal choice of y satisfies
(4) v"(y,w,r) + mV"(y,9,a,r) —0
In addition, equilibrium beliefs must be self-fulfilling. Thus, for any 9 and
the corresponding optimal value of y, we must have(5) V(y,w,r) —V(y,9,c,r)
We differentiate (5) to obtain
(6) V(y,w,v) —vS(y,e,,,r)+V(y,9,w,r)




Equation (7) is recognizable as a first order differential equation. The
solution, 9(y,w,r), must also satisfy the following initial condition:
(8) 9(O,w,r) —9
Equation (8) is a consequence of the fact that firms are correctly
identified as such in equilibrium; consequently, they have no reason to incur
the costs associated with a positive dividend.
To assess the effect of dividend taxation on the average
bang-for-the-buck, we need to evaluate V(y,w,i-). Unfortunately we have not
been able to prove a general result concerning the sign of this derivative.
Instead, we will present a partial result and an example.
Suppose for the moment that V(y,c,r) >0for y0. Then clearly, the
marginal bang-for-the-buck rises with r. Moreover, since V(O,c,r) —
V(0,,r')—V(O9,w0),the average bang-for-the-buck also rises with r.
If we can guarantee that V(y,w,r) >0only on some interval [0,] then, at
a minimum, the average and marginal bang-for-the-buck rise withon this
interval. Using equations (2), (5), and (7), it is possible to show that
(9) 'f(y,wr) —a[l.v;9[y,9(y,w,r),w)9(y,wr)]
From (8), it follows that 9(O,w,r) —0.Thus,(10) Vt(O,w,r) —a> 0
Equation (10) establishes that an increase in r increases the slope of the
market valuation function et y —0.Moreover, as long es 65(y,w,r) is
continuously differentiable, v will he positive in some neighborhood of
y —0.Thus, for smsll y, an increase in r necessarily increases both the
average and marginal bang-for-the-buck.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Figure 1 depicts the
function V'(y,w,r) for some fixed r and w. On the same diagram, we have
superimposed an indifference curve (1) for the manager of a type 1 firm. In
general, the equation for a type 6 indifference curve is given by
V +aV5(y,6,w,c)—C
where C is some constant. V5(y,w,r) must he tangent to I at the point
(,VGë.wr)J
whereis the level of dividends selected by a type 1firm.
Likewise, V(y,w,r) must be tangent to 'L'anindifference curve for the
manager of a type 6 firm, at the point (ot V(O6wO)J. As r rises (to
r'), the indifference curve for a 6 manager rotates upward around this point
(to I'). To preserve the tangency property, V5(y,w,r) muat also rotate
upwards (to V8(y,co,r')).
We now present an example designed to establish the proposition that the
dividend signaling hypothesis can indeed produce the result that an increase
in r raises the bang-for-the-buck globally. Suppose in particular that
(11) v(y,w,6) —6-(w-6)y,
where w > 6 Note that v' < 0, v > 0, and v5 > 0, so that V8(y,6,w t)has
H y 6 ye





Note that thia differential equation ia separable. It is therefore easy to
verify that the solution to (12) is
a —(1ta) (13) 9 (y,w,r) —w+r-K(1+y)
where K depends on the constant of integration. From (8), it follows that
K —w÷ r. Using (2), (5), (11), and (13), we find that
(14) V'(y,w,r) —
(w÷r)[l_(l÷y)_0]
From (14), it is evident that an increase in r raises both the marginal and
average bang-for-the-buck for all values of y >0.
This analysis does not rule out the possibility that, for some
parameterizations, the bang-for-the-buck falls with r when y is sufficiently
large. Nor does it rule this possibility out for theories of dividend
signaling that are not captured by our simple model. Nevertheless, taken
together with the existing literature on dividend signaling, it does suggest
that a positive relationship between r and the bang-for-the-buck is the most
natural consequence of the dividend signaling hypothesis. If the data point
to a negative relationship, we should become at least somewhat skeptical about
the validity of this hypothesis.
2.2 Alternative Hypotheses
In this section, we formulate a simple model of corporate dividend policy
based upon a stylized representation of alternative "traditionalt' hypotheses,
and argue that this model is capable of explaining the existing evidence ondividend announcement effects. We then show that such a model implies that
there should be an inverse relationship between the dividend tax rate and the
bang-for- the -buck.
Since the alternative hypotheses do not concern the transmission of
information, we drop the unobservable parameter e.Thus,the fundamental




One csn think of the function Va(.) as summarizing the effect of dividends on
managerial efficiency; alternatively, it could reflect shareholders' intrinsic
preferences for dividends vs. retained earnings. In contrast to the
signaling hypothesis, we asaume here that V() >0,at least over some
range. Thus, firma may pay dividends for their own sake, rather than to
convey information. Since investors observe y, w, and c, the market valuation
of this firm coincidea with its fundamental value:
(16) va(y,w,r) —V5(y,co,r)
While managerial utility depends in part upon V managers also care
directly about dividends. When dividends are high, managers have fewer
resources under their control; this depresses their utility. The relative
weights placed on V and y depend upon the firm's value-relevant
characteristics, a. However, we assume that dividend policy is not perfectly
predictable, given knowledge of a and the function Va(.) (if it was perfectly
predictable, then share price would not respond to dividend announcements,
since announcements would be perfectly anticipated, and their implications
capitalized into value). We represent this lack of perfect predictability by
supplementing the managerial preference function with an additional parameter,
o, that is determined randomly, and that is not publicly observed. Thus,
10managers act ss if they maximize some utility function, W(V,y,ca,a), where
W > 0 and WY < 0. Managers must, of course, ohey the restriction that
V —Vt(y,w,i-).The optimal choice of y is given hy yt(war)
Now we argue that this simple model can account for the central facts
* concerning share price responses to dividend announcements. Since W < 0,
managers will generally choose a level of dividends helow that which maximizes
value. That is, Vt(ya(w,a,r),w,r) > 0. Consequently, innovations in a
that increase y will tend to raise value (for fixed co and r), while
innovations in a that reduce y will depress value. Since a is unobserved,
share price will respond positively to the announcement of a dividend
increase, and negatively to the announcement of a reduction.5
Although this class of hypotheses -- whichhold that dividends contribute
directly to the vslue of the firm --arecspable of explaining the existing
evidence on dividend announcement effects, their implications differ from
those of dividend signaling models once the effect of dividend taxation on







In other words, both the average snd marginal bang-for-the-buck fall with r.
The intuition for this property is straightforward. Share price responds
positively to dividends because shareholders value dividends (either for their
5
Indeed, if V6(.) is concave in y, the absolute response to a reduction will
be greater than the response to an equivslent increase, which is also
consistent with existing evidence.
11own sake, or for their ebility to discipline managers). When dividends are
taxed, shareholders like them less; this attenuates the positive effect of
dividends on share price.
2.3 Related Observations
The analysis of sections 2.1 snd 2.2 suggests a much broader strategy for
testing the dividend signaling hypothesis. Although we have interpreted r as
a tax parameter, this is not at all fundamental to our argument. Indeed, one
can think of Tasg publicly observed variable that is positively related to
the marginal cost of paying dividends. Under the dividend signaling
hypothesis, the bang-for-the-buck should rise with r, while the alternative
hypotheses have the opposite implication.
The dividend signaling literature identifies the prospect of a cash
shortfall as one of the most important non-tax cost of paying dividends.
Certainly, there are many publicly observed variables that are correlated with
financial slack. One obvious candidate is a first's bond rating. When a
firm's bond rating is low, the public knows that (on average) paying dividends
is a relatively expensive activity. Thus, a firm with a low bond rating and
positive private information can deter imitation by firms with low bond
ratings and negative private information by paying a relatively small
dividend. In contrast, when a firm's bond rating is high, the public knows
that (on average) paying dividends is a relatively inexpensive activity.
Thus, a firm with a high bond rating and positive private information may have
to pay quite a substantial dividend in order to deter imitation by firms with
high bond ratings and negative private information. It follows that, under
the dividend signaling hypothesis, bond ratings should be positively
correlated with the bang-for-the-buck.
12Under the alternative hypotheses, the bang-for-the-buck will tend to be
low when observable information suggests that the marginal costs of paying
dividenda is high (e.g. the firm has a low bond rating). This conclusion
follows from the ssme considerations identified in section 2.2: when
dividends are known to be more costly, shareholders like them less, and this
attenuates the positive effect of dividends on share price.6
Our empirical analysis is designed to test between dividend signaling
and the alternative hypotheses by examining the effects of kQth dividend
taxation and observable firm characteristics (specifically, bond ratings) on
the bang-for-the-buck. In the next section, we discuss our strategy for
measuring the relationship between dividend tax rates (r) and the
bang-for-the-buck. The reader should bear in mind that it is equally
appropriate to interpret r as any publicly observed variable that is
positively correlated with the marginal costs of paying dividends. Any factor
that increases this marginal cost can, in a broad sense, be thought of as a
dividend "tax."
3. Empiricsl Strategy
In the next section, we estimate the derivative of the market valuation
function with respect to dividends (v(y,wr)J .Wethen examine the sign of
to distinguish between signaling (V >0)and the alternative hypotheses
(V <0).
yl
6Under the managerial discipline hypothesis, there is an additional reason
to expect this result. Management is assumed to operate inefficiently when an
organization has financial slack. Firms with high bond ratings typically have
more slack. Thus, a given dividend should be more beneficial when bond
ratings are high. One might object to this conclusion on the grounds that
firms with low bond ratings are generally managed by individuals who are more
inclined to place their own interests over those of the stockholders. This
hypothesis strikes us as only marginally plausible.
13Estimates of V(y,w,r) are obtained by studying the effects of dividend
announcements on share price. This is accomplished as follows. Let St denote
the value of a firm's equity at time t, and let y, r, and a denote
respectively the contemporaneous dividend announcement, dividend tax rate, and








(where the operator E takes an expectation, treating y as a random variable).
Now suppose that we estimate an equation of the form
(18) R —r(y,a,r)+c
t t ttt
wherec is a random disturbance. Presumably, c arises from our inability to
control for all of the relevant information revealed at time t. Under the
assumption that c is uncorrelated with other observable variables (including
the dividend announcement), C(y,w,T) represents an estimate of the
right-hand side of (17). Note that




V (y ,a ,r )
(20) r(y,w,r) —"_: 4
Since Sis strictly positive r and V are necessarily of the same sign.
t-1 yr yr
Consequently, we implement our test by determining the sign of r.




Thatis, share price will respond to the unexpected component of the dividend
announcement. In that case, one can write I'() as a function of u ,o ,and
tt
r.We adopt this simplification in our empirical analysis.
Historical data on daily share prices and dividend announcements were
obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) NYSE/AMEX and
NASDAQ data files. For the purpose of our analysis, an observation consists
of an instance in which a firm announced an increase in dividends. Previous
research suggests that share price responds more strongly to the announcement
of a negative change in dividends, than to the announcement of a positive
change. It is conceivable that positive and negative changes are driven by
fundamentally different processes. We therefore chose to focus exclusively on
cases in which firms announced increases in dividends. Our basic sample
consists of all such announcements occurring between the beginning of 1962 and
the end of 1988.
For the regressions reported here, cumulative abnormal returns (A) are
used as the dependent variable. These returns are measured over a three-day
window, centered on the announcement date. Conceptually, the abnormal return
should be thought of as R -E[RIør];
in other words, we simply move the
term E[RIwr] to the left-hand side of equation (17). This comporta with
common practice in the literature on the measurement of dividend announcement
effects.
In practice, E[RIwr] is not observable. For the results reported
here we simply use the concurrent return on a value-weighted market portfolio,
R. When abnormal returns are calculated in this manner, they are usually
referred to as "market adjusted returns" (see BrownandWarner (1985)).
15Clearly R is not an ideal measure of EIRIa ,r1.However,this is not
LtttJ
likelyto create prohlems for two reasons. First, we are not concerned here
with the level of dividend announcement effects. Rather, we are attempting to
estimate the extent to which dividend announcement effects vary with dividend
tax rates. Even if the average ahnormal return is biased in one direction or
another, as long as this bias does not change systematically with tax rates,
it does not affect our ability to test between the hypotheses of interest.
Second, if it is possible to write EIRIa,r1asthe sumofR end some
Ltt tJ nit
functiong(w,T), then one can interpret our estimated relationship as a
version of equation (17) in which R has been moved to the left-hand side,
and g(w,r) remains on the right-hand size.
Independent variables were constructed as follows. ADIV measures the
it
size of the dividend change announced at time t for security i. Formally,




where is the last dividend paid prior to date t, D is the new dividend
announced at date t, and p is the average share price in the ten-day period
preceding the dividend announcement window.
ADIV functions as our measure of u, the unexpected component of the
dividend announcement. The use of this variable is justified if, as is
commonly assumed in the literature, investors typically expect firms to
maintain their dividends at previous levels. However, it is important to
realize that our central test of the dividend signaling hypothesis remains
valid even when this assumption is not satisfied. In that case, u can be
thought of as a linear combination of and other right-hand side variables.
Although this alters the interpretation of coefficients for variables other
than DIV ,thecoefficient of E1DIV still measures r (). it it y
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wherem is the marginal dividend tax rate at time t for investors in class
it
i,zis the accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate at time t for
investors in class i, c's is the tax rate on undistributed profits prevailing
at time t, ware equity ownership weights, and s is the number of distinct
shareholder classes. We obtained historical data on THETA from Poterba
[1987]
Three features of this variable deserve emphasis. First, THETA varies
only over time, not across firms. In principle, one could construct a
firm-specific tax clientele variable by studying ex-dividend day behavior for
individual firms (as in Auerbach [1985]). Unfortunately, this method of
measuring effective tax rates is not valid under certain important hypotheses
concerning dividend policy.8 In addition, measures of tax rates constructed
from ex-dividend day share price movements are usually very imprecise. It is
therefore not surprising that, in previous studies, the use of firm-specific
tax clientele variables has shed little if any light on the determinants of
corporate financial policy (see e.g. Auerbach [1985] and Mackie-Mason [1988]).
We eschew this approach, and use a more reliable aggregate measure of the tax
burden on dividends.
For 1987 and 1988 data on THETA were obtained directly from Poterba
(private communication).
8 Forexample, if shareholders prefer dividends because dividends provide
liquidity, then firma should pay dividends until, on the margin, the benefits
of liquidity just offset the tax costs. This implies that share prices should
fall by one dollar for each dollar of dividends on the ex-day, regardless of
the tax rate.
17Second, Poterba's measure of the relative tax hurden on dividends is only
available on a yearly basis. Let 9k denote the value of this variable in
year k. For a dividend announcement date Ct) falling in year k, we set
THETA —B.Inother words, we assume that dividend tax rates change
t k
discretely at the end of each year. In some cases, this is entirely
appropriate (e.g. new statutes went into effect at the end of the year). In
other instances, it is more likely that changes in occurred gradually (e.g.
because of changes in the composition of stock ownership). Since most of the
variation in 9 results from changes in the tax law, and since we omit
dividend announcements that occurred close to the effective dates of major tax
reforms (see below), it is unlikely that our analysis is significantly flawed
by our failure to account for intra year variation in THETA.
Third, note that THETA is inversely related to the effective tax rate on
dividends (m). It is important to bear this fact in mind when evaluating
our empirical results. Under the signaling hypothesis, an increase in THETA
should decrease the bang-for-the-buck; the alternative hypotheses imply that
an increase in THETA should increase the bang-for-the-buck.
In section 2.3, we argued that, for the purpose of our analysis, one can
think of any publicly observed factor that increases the marginal cost of
paying dividends as a dividend "tax." It follows that one can also test the
dividend signaling hypothesis against the alternatives by examining the
relationships between bang-for-the-buck and other firm-specific
characteristics. In this paper, we focus on bond ratings, which are
summarizedby the variable HIRATED.HIRATEDisa dummyvariablethat
it it
takesona value of 1 if firm i's bond rating is BE+ or better, and is equal
to0 if the bond rating is worse than 88+. Under the dividend signaling
hypothesis,we expect to observe a greater bang-for-the-buck when
HIRATED —0. it
18Historical data on bond ratings were obtained from quarterly Compustat
files. These data are available beginning in 1977. For years prior to 1977,
we assumed that firm i's bond rating was equal to its 1977 value. To obtain
some feel for the validity of this assumption, we examined changes in bond
ratings between the earliest and latest dates for which Compustat data were
available. It should be noted that these data span a 14-year period
(1977-1990). Over this period, roughly 97% of all firms did not experience
changes in bond ratings large enough to alter their values of HIRATEO1. For
a number of reasons, we also conducted our analysis of dividend announcement
effects using a shorter sample period (1978-1988) that is completely covered
by the Compustat files.
Even subsequent to 1977, Compustat does not contain information on bond
ratings for all firms covered by the CRSP tapes. When bond ratings were not
available, we imputed the value of HIRATED based on auxiliary regressions.9
Ourempiricalstrategy also requires us to identify variables that
summarize important aspects of publicly available information
Obviously, the market has access to a great deal of information on virtually
every publicly traded company. In our analysis, it is important to control
for variables that ought to affect the market's interpretation of a dividend
announcement.
If a company has experienced substantial share price appreciation since
its last dividend change, the market may regard the announcement of a dividend
increase as an effort to keep pace, rather than as an attempt to signal
fundamentally new information. Likewise, if there has been substantial
inflation since a company last changed its dividend, the announcement of an
Each auxiliary regression explained HIRATED as a function of the other
independent variables. We estimated the auxiliary regressions using
subsamples for which complete data were available.
19increase might be interpreted as an adjustment for inflation. To control for
these factors, we introduce the variables CR0 and INFL •whichrepresent, it it
respectively, the growth in share price and the CPI since firmi'slest
dividend change.
The amount of time that has elapsed since a company's last dividend
change may also color the market's reaction to the announcement of an
increase. A given change in dividends may be more significant for companies
that rarely alter dividend policy, than for companies that have changed
dividends frequently. To account for this possibility, we introduce the
variable MONTHS which is defined as the length of time (in months) between t
and t' ,where(as before) t' is the date of firm i's most recent dividend
change prior to date t.
Finally, it is conceivable that share price responses to dividend
announcements may vary with current macroeconomic conditions. For example, a
dividend increase may be a more persuasive signal of good prospects during a
recession than during a boom. To allow for this possibility, we include the
variable CAP, which measures seasonally adjusted capacity utilization in the
manufacturing sector for the month in which the dividend announcement (at time
t) took place. Note that, in contrast to THETA, CAP varies monthly, rather
than annually.
We estimated a variety of empirical specifications explaining abnormal
returns, A ,asa function of ADIV ,THETA,CAP,CR0
,INFL ,MONTHS
it it t t it it it
and HIRATED ,aswell as interactions between these variables. Our results
it
were robust across specifications. For purposes of brevity, we report results
based on only two specifications. Both have the following form:
A —fl+tDIV [fl+flTHETA +flHIRATEO +X -yl+Zy +c
it 0 itLi 2 t 3 it itij it2 it
where X is a vector of the other publicly observed variables and the vector
Zconsists of X ,THETA,andHIRATED The first specification does not
it it t it
20restrict the values of any coefficients in this equation. While this provides
for a flexible functional form, evaluation of the hang-for-the-buck through a
casual inspection of the estimated coefficients is difficult. Our second
specification imposes the restriction that y— 0,which allows the reader
more easily to infer a bang-for-the-buck for different values of THETA and
HIRATED. In light of equation (20), one can determine the sign of V by
examining fi.Iffi<0, higher dividend taxation increases the
bang-for-the-buck, as predicted by the dividend signaling hypothesis. One can
also perform a comparable test based on bond ratings by examining fi.
Thesespecifications were estimated with OLS, using White's [1980] method
of calculating heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errorsJ° From our basic
sample covering the 1962-1988 period, we excluded observations for a number of
reasons.
First, to construct several independent variables, we required data on a
prior dividend change. Consequently, we were forced to drop the first
dividend announcement for each firm.
Second, we excluded all dividend announcements occurring in close
proximity to major shifts in tax policy. During our sample period, there were
two instances of tax reform that significantly altered the relative taxation
of dividends and capital gains. The first occurred in 1981, the second in
1986. Theory suggests that a given change in dividends may convey different
information, depending upon whether it occurs in response to a change in tax
regime, or to other factors. In particular, the distribution of y
conditional on w and r may be different when tax policy has just changed
(and firms are adjusting to the new regime) than when the current tax policy
10 Theuse of White's correction is particularly appropriate given the fact
that HIRATEDis imputed for some observations. it
21has persisted for some time. We handled this ptoblem by dropping dividend
announcements occurring in one-year windows centered around January 1, 1982
and January 1, 1987 (exclusion criterion "A"). We examined the sensitivity of
our results to alternative selection criteria. We also report here results
based upon the alternative criterion of dropping the first dividend change for
each firm after the two major shifts in tax policy (exclusion criterion "8").
We also estimated (but do not report) regressions in which no observations
were excluded for this reason; the results were similar.
Some previous studies of dividend announcement effects also exclude
observations for which earnings announcements occur in close proximity to
dividend announcements. This is important when one's purpose is to measure
the absolute level of abnormal returns on dividend announcement dates. Our
object is to examine how the sensitivity of abnormal returns to dividends
varies with observable factors that are correlated with the marginal cost of
dividends. There is no particular reason to believe that the bias created by
including observations with earnings announcement conflicts is systematically
related to tax regimes or bond ratings. Thus, we estimate one set of
regressions in which no exclusions are made for this reason.
To ascertain the extent to which our results might be affected by the
inclusion of observations with earnings announcement conflicts, we also
estimated a set of regressions in which these observations were removed from
the sample. Unfortunately, the available data on earnings announcements
begin in 1978. Thus, when excluding observations with earnings announcement
conflicts, we also dropped all dividend announcements occurring before 1978.11
11 For completeness we also estimated (but do not report) a set of regressions
for the sample period 1978-1988, where earnings announcement conflicts were
not removed. The results were similar.
22These regressions are of particular interest since, as mentioned previously,
data on bond ratings are svailable beginning in 1917.
For the 1962-1988 sample period, exclusion criterion A leaves us with
12,961 observations. For exclusion criterion B, the number of observations
falls to 12,054. For the 1978-1988 sample period with earnings announcement
conflicts removed, we have 4519 observations with exclusion criterion A, and
3749 observations with exclusion criterion B.
At several points in this discussion, we mentioned that our results are
not particularly sensitive to alternative (unreported) estimation strategies,
such as the use of different specifications, sample definitions, and exclusion
criteria. We also experimented with variable definitions, and continued to
obtain similar results. The regressions presented in the next section were
chosen because they exemplify the robust patterns exhibited by a much larger
set of estimates.
4. Results
Regreasion results for the 1962 through 1988 sample period are reported
in Table 1. Table 2 contains results for the 1978-1988 aample, where earnings
announcement conflicts have been removed. For our purposes, the coefficients
of primary interest are those associated with tDIV, ADIVTHETA, and
ADIVHIRATED. An inspection of these coefficients reveals two robust patterns.
First, the coefficients of ADIVTHETA are negative and estimated quite
precisely. In each of the eight regressions, the asaociated t-atatistic
exceeds 2; in most cases it exceeds 2.5. These coefficients imply that an
increase in the dividend tax rate raises the bang-for-the-buck (V > 0) for
firms with low bond ratings. This finding is consistent with the dividend
signaling hypothesis, and inconsistent with the alternatives outlined in
section 2.
23Second, the coefficients of EsDIVHIRATED ere all negative.
Unfortunstely, in Table 1 the estimated values of these coefficients are not
statistically significant at conventional levels of confidence. Mote
significant effects --botheconomically and statistically --arefound in
Table 2. This is to be expected, since all bond ratings prior to 1977 are
imputed. The effect of a high bond rating on the bang-for-the-buck is both
negative and statistically significant (at conventional levels) in equations 1
and 3 of Table 2. Statistical significance is somewhat lower in equations 2
and 4.
Aa we have argued in section 2.3, a negative relationship between bond
rating and bang-for-the-buck also argues in favor of the dividend signaling
hypothesis. In effect, an increase in the marginal cost of paying dividends
arising from an observable deterioration of a firm's financial condition is
analogous to an increase in the marginal coat of dividends arising from an
increase in the dividend tax rate. Under the signaling hypothesis and the
alternatives, the effect of a decline in bond rating should therefore be
compareble to the effect of an increase in the tax rate. Thus, the evidence
on the effect of bond ratings contained in Tables I and 2 offers qualified
support for the dividend signaling hypothesis.
As a plausibility check on the estimates in Tables 1 and 2, we have also
calculated the bang-for-the-buck (the derivative of the excess return with
respect to tDIV), evaluated at the mean values of the other independent
variables. The resulting estimates of bang-for-the-buck, along with their
associated standard errors, are presented in the final row of these tables.
For example, the estimates in the second column of Table 1 imply that a one
percentage point increase in the ratio of dividends to share price raises the
abnormal return over the announcement window by 3.28 percentage points. Note
that this effect is estimated with great precision in all of the
24specifications. To put these estimates in perspective, conaider the fact
that, over the sample period, the average announced dividend increase was
roughly 0.14% of share price. A firm announcing an increase equal to twice
this average would, on average, improve its abnormal return over the
W announcementwindow by 0.46 percentage points. This compares with an average
abnormal return of 1.19% for all observations in our sample.
One possible criticism of this analysis is that THETA may not be an
appropriate measure of the tax burden on dividends, relative to undiatributed
profits. THETA depends in part on the measurement of effective tax rates for
different classes of investors. Measurement of such rates--particularly the
accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate--is notoriously difficult. Indeed,
Balcer and Judd [1987) have argued that it is impossible to summarize the
"effective" rate of capital gains taxation with a single number. Moreover,
THETA is calculated as a weighted average of effective tax rates for different
classes of investors. If some particular class of investors accounts for a
disproportionate share of arbitrage activity, then this weighted average will
he inappropriate.
Fortunately, it is possible to test the hypotheses of interest without
attaching significance to particular values of THETA. Although the dividend
tax rate does vary form year to year, much of this variation results from s
small number of significant tax reforms. For example, although THETA rose
from 0.691 in 1979 to 0.784 in 1985, more than half of this increase occurred
between 1981 and 1982, when the first round of the Regan edministretion's tax
reforms went into effect. A second round of tax reforms increased THETA from
0.783 in 1986, to 0.825 in 1987, and to 0.880 in 1988. Regardless of whether
one credits the particular numbers, it is clear that the relative tax burden
on dividends declined significantly after each round of tax reform.
Consequently, we divided our sample period into three regimes: pre-1982
25(regime I, high dividend taxetion), 1982 to 1986 (regime II, medium dividend
taxetion), and 1981 to 1988 (regime III, low dividend taxation). We
reestimated our hasic specification for each regime, omitting THETA and
interactions involving THETA. We then compared estimates across regimes. The
signaling hypothesis implies that the bang-for-the-buck should decline from
regime I to regime II, and from regime II to regime III. It also implies that
the bang-for-the-buck should be lower for firms with higher bond ratings
within each regime. The alternative hypotheses have the opposite
implications.
Results appear in Table 3. Estimates for regimes I, II, and III are
based on 2154, 1710, and 655 observations, respectively. The final row of
this table provides an estimate of the bang-for-the-buck for firms with low
bond ratings, evaluated at the mean values of the other independent variables.
An inspection of these results reveals several patterns. First, the
bang-for-the-buck declines sharply across regimes. Indeed, in the third
regime, one can no longer reject the hypothesis that an increase in dividends
makes no marginal contribution to abnormal returns. Second, the estimated
bang-for-the-buck is significantly lower (both economically and statistically)
for firma with high bond ratings, both in regime I and regime II. Although it
is higher in regime III, this result is not statistically significant (the
coefficient of tDIVHIRATED is email relative to its standard error).
Apparently, the absence of stronger results on the effect of bond rating in
Tables 1 and 2 is exclusively attributable to behavior in regime III, during
which low dividend tax rates apparently muted the marginal effect of dividends
on excess returns. Overall, these findings argue strongly in favor of the
dividend signaling hypothesis.
Another potential objection to this analysis is that variation in tax
rates is only present across years, and not across firms. Since THETA tends
26to decline over the sample period, our effort to measure tax effects could
conceivably pick up some spurious trend. We are inclined to doubt this
hypothesis for two reasons. First, the evidence on tax effects is
corroborated by evidence on bond ratings, and bond ratings vary considerably
across firms. Second, the most plausible explanation for a spurious trend
suggests that our estimates should be biased against the dividend signaling
hypothesis. During the l980s, domestic firma faced increasing levels of
competition from abroad. Casual evidence suggests that, as a result,
investors became more sensitive to managerial inefficiency. Thus, in the
absence of signaling, one would have expected to observe an increase in the
bang-for-the-buck during the 1980s.
It is also possible to teat directly the hypothesis that the evolution of
the bang-for-the-buck through time results from changes in the tax regime,
rather than from some other consideration. We refer the reader to figure 2
for a schematic depiction of our testing strategy. In this figure, the
sampling period is divided into the 3 tax regimes. The second regime is
further subdivided into two subregimes, ha and lIb. We propose performing
teats for structural change across regimes and subregimea. Teat 1 examines
whether the relationship governing exceaa returns is the same in regime I as
in regime ha. Test 2 examinea the atsbility of the excess return
relationship over regimes ha and lib. Teat 3 compares the estimated
relationahipa for regimes hlb and III. Each of these compariaona involves a
joint teat for the equality of 12 coefficient pairs. Under the hypothesis
that the evolution of the excess return relationship is driven by changes in
the tax regime, we would expect to obtain the following reaults:
Teat 1: Reject equality of coefficienta
Test 2: Do not reject equality of coefficients
Teat 3: Reject equality of coefficienta
27Under the alternative hypothesis that the evolution of the excess return
relationship is driven by spurious factors, one would not expect to obtsin the
same pattern of results, except by some improbably coincidence. If, for
example, the process of change was relatively smooth, one would expect to
obtain roughly similar test statistics for tests 1, 2, and 3. Each joint
hypothesis might or might not be rejected; the key point is that there would
not be a dramatic, systematic difference in the test statistics across the
three joint hypotheses.
One might object that the data are more likely to reject test 1, for two
reasons. First, although regimes ha, lib, and III are all roughly of the
same duration, regime I is roughly twice as long. If there is a spurious
trend, then there will be less similarity between behavior in regime Ia (the
first half of regime I) and regime ha than between behavior in regimes ha
and hib, since the temporal separation between regimes Ia and lie is greater
than that between regimes ha and lib. Second, since regime I is longer, it
contains substantially more data. This implies that the coefficients will be
estimated more precisely. If any change occurs through time, greater
precision makes rejection more likely.
*
Weaddress this objection by performing a fourth test (test I ),whtch
examines the stability of the excess return relationship over regimes lb and
Ila. Since regime lb is roughly of the same duration as regimes lie, hhb, and
III, the basis for the objection is eliminated.
Results are contained in Table 4. Tests 1 and 1* decisively reject the
hypothesis of structural stability at the 99% level of confidence. Test 3
also rejects the hypothesis of structural stability at that 95% level of
confidence. In sharp contrast, the F-statistic for test 2 is actually less
than unity. Thus, there is strong evidence that the relationship of interest
changed significantly between regimes I and II, and between regimes II and
28III, but that this relationship remained remarkably steble during regime II.
This is precisely the pattern that would emerge if the evolution of the
relationship for excess returns was primarily driven by changes in the tax
system, end it differs sharply from the pattern that one would expect to find
if the evolution of the relationship for excess returns was primarily driven
by other factors.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the dividend signaling hypothesis
implies that abnormal returns should be more sensitive to the magnitude of
announced dividend changes when observable factors (such as tax rates and bond
ratings) suggest that the marginal costs of dividends are high. Plausible
alternative hypotheses have the opposite implication. Our empirical
investigation reveals thet the "bang-for-the-buck" generated by dividend
announcements rises with the dividend tax rate and fells with bond rating.
These findings are favorable to the signaling hypothesis.
Our tests emphasize implications of signaling that do not appear to be
particularly model-specific. Consequently, it may be possible to adapt our
approsch in order to test signaling models in other contexts. For example,
one might test the hypothesis that education functions as a signal of ability
by identifying observable employee characteristics that are systematically
correlated with the costs of obtsining education. Under the signaling
hypothesis, the returns to sdditional education should be higher for those
individuals whose observable costs of education are also high.
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1 2 3 4
Constant 0.0168 0.0189 0.00787 0.00904
(0.0147) (0.0187) (0.0163) (0.0209)
DIV 14.9 14.2 13.3 14.3
(4.37) (10.1) (4.55) (10.6)
DIVTHETA -16.0 -20.8 -14.2 -18.6
(5.53) (5.71) (5.75) (6.08)
DIV•HIRATED -1.57 -1.03 -1.04 -0.534









THETA/b2 -1.31 -0.789 -1.73 -1.35
(0.984) (0.999) (0.982) (1.00)
HIRATED/103 2.25 1.53 1.94 1.25
(2.17) (1.98) (2.09) (1.94)
CAP/b4 -0.316 -3.66 -0.0187 -3.30
(0.788) (1.05) (0.837) (1.10)
GR0/10 0.225 -5.23 -0.729 -12.2
(7.52) (12.95) (8.30) (15.3)
INFL/102 0.182 2.41 1.12 3.56
(0.699) (1.03) (0.837) (1.20)
MONTHS/b6 2.16 -12.7 -1.02 -17.1
(4.38) (6.83) (4.88) (7.40)
Root MSE 0.0366 0.0365 0.0357 0.0355









Notes:(1) Standard errors in parentheses
(2) Bang-for-the-buck is calculated at the mean values of the
independent variables for the 1962 -1988period.




1 2 3 4
Constant -0.0444 -0.0395 -0.0599 -0.0548







































THETA/b2 2.29 -3.14 1.98 2.27









CAP/b4 -0.336 -4.87 -0.467 -5.18
(1.48) (2.34) (1.65) (2.54)
CRO/104 35.9 36.0 37.7 36.9









MONTHS/iC8 -15.2 -32.9 -37.9 -79.7
(11.8) (15.6) (15.4) (24.2)
Root MSE 0.0364 0.363 0.336 0.0336









Notes: (1) Standarderrors in parentheses
(2) Bang-for-the-buck is calculated st the mean values of the
independent variables for the 1978 -1988period.
33Table : Tax Regime Estimates
Regime 1 Regime II Regime III Variable
(1978- 1981) (1982 -1986) (1987 -1988)
Constant .0.324 0.0284 0.199
(0.197) (0.0491) (0.238)
ADIV 181 11.6 1.45
(118) (32.7) (47.2)
ADIV•HIRATED -9.89 -4.80 3.00
(2.20) (1.98) (4.87)
ADIV•CAP 0.305 0.335 0.180
(0.346) (0.246) (0.544)
ADIV•GRO -4.38 4.70 -2.17
(1.55) (2.04) (7.29)
ADIV.INFL -197 -38.5 -13.9
(96.4) (28.2) (37.4)
DIV.M0NTHS/l02 20.5 1.77 -0.255
(8.57) (1.73) (2.64)
HIRATED/103 12.1 2.72 6.43
(4.47) (3.81) (13.1)
CAP/b4 -5.95 -9.48 -45.8
(5.66) (3.77) (18.9)
CR01104 67.9 -3.36 122
(30.4) (19.9) (78.5)
INFL/102 36.9 4.89 17.7
(16.6) (3.88) (15.1)
MONTHS/b6 -370 -19.5 -70.0
(150) (22.8) (67.0)
RootMSE 0.0313 0.0313 0.0495
Bang-for-the-buck 19.8 5.21 -2.17
(5.35) (1.83) (2.24)
Notes:(1) Standard errors in parentheses
(2) Bang-for-the-buck is calculated at the mean values of the
independent variables for the 1978 -1988period, except for
HIRATED, which is set equal to zero.
34Table 4:TestsforStructural Chan&e




1 I and ha F(12,3020) —2.86 0.06%
1*
lb and lie F(l2,2064) —2.27 0.75%
2 ha and lib F(l2,l686) —0.74 71.29%
3 hIb and III F(l2,l451) —1.91 2.95%
35